The New Global Village



Botnets: An Update

Jim Lippard, Director, Information Security Operations, Global Crossing InfraGard Phoenix December 12, 2005







1. Botnet overview

Bot and botnet defined, botnet basics, the botnet economy.

2. Botnet trends and numbers

Botnet controllers, phishing attacks, spam, denial of service attacks.

3. Botnet users

Those who have been caught.

4. Botnet defense

Prevention, detection, and response.

5. The future of botnets





Bot: An Internet software agent designed to perform some task or set of tasks, intended to interact with network-based services as though it were a person. Bots may be web crawlers, chat/IRC bots, attack bots, fraud bots, etc. The bots we're talking about are those put on computer systems without the permission (and often without the knowledge) of the owner—usually end-user Windows machines with connectivity from commercial broadband ISPs.

Botnet: A collection of bots under the control of a single entity, usually through a commandand-control server using IRC as the control channel. Legitimate botnets: SETI@Home, Distributed.net, Google Compute. (Note that none of these take full control of the operating system; criminal botnets usually do.)

Botnet controller: A system controlling a botnet. Usually a compromised Unix host at one of a relatively small number of commercial webhosting providers, running ircd.

Spam senders: Usually located in webhosting colo space, may be bogus company, fake webhoster or fake ISP.

Proxy web interface or custom application: May be hosted/distributed through legitimate large ISPs.

Marketing/deal-making locations: Public IRC channels, web-based message boards.





One person can fill multiple functions, but these are also commonly distinct roles, with commercial relationships between them.

Botherd: Collects and manages bots.

Botnet seller: Sells the use of bots (or proxies) to spammers.

Spammer: Sends spam.

Sponsor: Pays spammer to promote products or services.

Exploit developer: Develops code to exploit vulnerabilities.

Virus writer: Develops mechanism for delivering infection using exploit code.

Bot developer: Develops (or more commonly, modifies existing) bot code.

Money launderer ("payment processor"): Work-at-home opportunity to process payments/launder money for "sponsors."

Phishers: Collectors of user identity and bank information.

Cashers: Use phished bank data to make fake ATM cards and withdraw funds.





Early 1990s: IRC channel bots (e.g., eggdrop, mIRC scripts, ComBot, etc.).

Late 1990s: Denial of service tools (e.g., Trinoo, Tribal Flood Network, Stacheldraht, Shaft, etc.).

2000: Merger of DDoS tools, worms, and rootkits (e.g., Stacheldraht+t0rnkit+Ramen worm; Lion worm+TFN2K).

- 2002: IRC-controlled bots implementing DDoS attacks.
- 2003: IRC-controlled bots spread with worms and viruses, fully implementing DDoS, spyware, malware distribution activity.

(Dave Dittrich, "Invasion Force," Information Security, March 2005, p. 30)

2003-2005: Botnets used as a criminal tool for extortion, fraud, identity theft, computer crime, spam, and phishing.

2005: Bot infections via Zotob (August), Toxbot (October), Sober (November-December). (Sober.W, X, Y, Z impersonated FBI, CIA, German and Austrian federal police, UK National High-Tech Crime Unit (NHTCU), etc.)





Korgobot SpyBot (variants/offshoots include AgoBot, Phatbot, SDBots) Optix Pro rBot Toxbot Zotob

AgoBot/Phatbot is notable for featuring well-written, modular code supporting DoS attacks, spam proxying, ability to launch viruses, scan for vulnerabilities, steal Windows Product Keys, sniff passwords, support GRE tunnels, self-update, etc. Phatbot control channel is WASTE (encrypted P2P) instead of IRC.

Bots refute the common argument that "there's nothing on my computer that anyone would want" (usually given as an excuse not to bother securing the system). The computing power and bandwidth alone make compromising a system desirable and useful.



Botnet overview: Phatbot feature list



Phatbot command list (from LURHQ)

bot.command runs a command with system() bot.unsecure enable shares / enable dcom bot secure delete shares / disable dcom bot.flushdns flushes the bots dns cache bot.quit quits the bot bot.longuptime If uptime > 7 days then bot will respond bot.sysinfo displays the system info bot.status gives status ot.rndnick makes the bot generate a new random nick bot.removeallbut removes the bot if id does not match bot.remove removes the bot bot.open opens a file (whatever) bot.nick changes the nickname of the bot bot.id displays the id of the current code bot.execute makes the bot execute a .exe bot.dns resolves ip/hostname by dns bot.die terminates the bot bot.about displays the info the author wants you to see shell.disable Disable shell handler shell.enable Enable shell handler shell.handler FallBack handler for shell commands list Lists all available commands plugin.unload unloads a plugin (not supported yet) plugin.load loads a plugin cvar.saveconfig saves config to a file cvar.loadconfig loads config from a file cvar.set sets the content of a cvar cvar.get gets the content of a cvar cvar.list prints a list of all cvars inst.svcdel deletes a service from scm inst.svcadd adds a service to scm inst.asdel deletes an autostart entry inst.asadd adds an autostart entry logic.ifuptime exec command if uptime is bigger than specified mac.login logs the user in mac.logout logs the user out ftp.update executes a file from a ftp url ftp.execute updates the bot from a ftp url ftp.download downloads a file from ftp http.visit visits an url with a specified referrer http.update executes a file from a http url http.execute updates the bot from a http url http.download downloads a file from http

rsl.logoff logs the user off rsl.shutdown shuts the computer down rsl.reboot reboots the computer pctrl.kill kills a process pctrl.list lists all processes scan.stop signal stop to child threads scan.start signal start to child threads scan.disable disables a scanner module scan.enable enables a scanner module scan.clearnetranges clears all netranges registered with the scanner scan.resetnetranges resets netranges to the localhost scan.listnetranges lists all netranges registered with the scanner scan.delnetrange deletes a netrange from the scanner scan.addnetrange adds a netrange to the scanner ddos.phatwonk starts phatwonk flood ddos.phaticmp starts phaticmp flood ddos.phatsyn starts phatsyn flood ddos.stop stops all floods ddos.httpflood starts a HTTP flood ddos.svnflood starts an SYN flood ddos.udpflood starts a UDP flood redirect.stop stops all redirects running redirect.socks starts a socks4 proxv redirect.https starts a https proxy redirect.http starts a http proxy redirect.gre starts a gre redirect redirect.tcp starts a tcp port redirect harvest.aol makes the bot get aol stuff harvest.cdkeys makes the bot get a list of cdkeys harvest.emailshttp makes the bot get a list of emails via http harvest.emails makes the bot get a list of emails waste.server changes the server the bot connects to waste.reconnect reconnects to the server waste.raw sends a raw message to the waste server waste.quit waste.privmsg sends a privmsg waste.part makes the bot part a channel waste.netinfo prints netinfo waste mode lets the bot perform a mode change waste.join makes the bot join a channel waste.gethost prints netinfo when host matches waste.getedu prints netinfo when the bot is .edu waste.action lets the bot perform an action waste.disconnect disconnects the bot from waste





Botnets are used as an economic mechanism for shifting costs of business (often illegal business) to others, including the costs of being caught engaging in illegal activity.

Botnets (a) create a buffer between a criminal and criminal activity and (b) provide a massive information processing resource at minimal cost to the criminal.

Some financial transactions which botnets facilitate:

•Sale of the use of bots.

•Use of bots for marketing the sale of products and services (often fraudulent or illegal) via spam.

•Use of bots for extortion (denial of service against online gambling companies, credit card processors, etc.).

•Use of bots to send phishing emails to steal personal identity and account information.



Botnet overview: Bot life cycle





- 1. Miscreant (botherd) launches worm, virus, or other mechanism to infect Windows machine.
- 2. Infected machines contact botnet controller via IRC. 2.5: Infection vector closed.
- 3. Spammer (sponsor) pays miscreant for use of botnet.
- 4. Spammer uses botnet to send spam emails. (Usually NOT through IRC channel; typically botherd will open proxy ports on bots and provide proxy list to spammer.)

(Image from Wikipedia.)





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Botnet overview: Trojan software wanted







Botnet overview: IRC conversation



<A> Unconfirmed Orders 14

<A> Cash Earned \$4,740.30

<A> Amount Due: \$183.86

<A> hghaaaahaha'

<A> you are weak

<A> im glad i got all my emails out last year

<A> last year i could pull 40/k a month easy

 wow !!

<A> this year same time, its like 4/k

<A> wierd how spam changes in a year

<A> guess its like hiv, everyone is spreading it

<C> and more people are hating it

<C> hehe

 ive pulled in alot this month

(From National Cyber-Forensics & Training Alliance, early 2004.)





Drop in DoS attacks and email-based attacks other than phishing. Percentage of email that is spam:

2002: 9%. 2003: 40%. 2004: 73%. 3Q 2005: 66.7%

Percentage of email containing viruses:

2002: 0.5%. 2003: 3%. 2004: 6.1%. 3Q 2005: 2.4%

A majority of viruses contain backdoors or create botnets. (MessageLabs, 2004 Annual Report)

Number of phishing emails:

Total through September 2003: 293

Total through September 2004: >2 million

Monthly since September 2004: 2-9.1 million

September 2005: 4.8 million

(Source: MessageLabs 2004 Annual Report, September 2005 report.)

Denial of Service Attacks (reported):

2002: 48 (16/mo). 2003: 409 (34/mo). 2004: 482 (40/mo). Jan. 1-Dec. 12, 2005: 297 (26/mo). (1Q: 77—26/mo, 2Q: 64—21/mo, 3Q: 84—28/mo, 4Q to Dec. 12: 74—31/mo)

(Above from Global Crossing; 2002 is for Oct-Dec only.)



Botnet trends: SpamCop Stats, Nov. 2005







Botnet trends: SpamCop Stats, Dec. 2005







Botnet trends: Infected IPs Jan 2004-Jan 2005



Unique Infected IPs





Botnet trends: Internet/GLBC downstream infected hosts





Botnet trends: GLBC downstream malware-infected hosts



GLBC Unique Infected IPs



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Botnet trends: Phishing websites downstream of AS 3549 (per day)





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As of June 7, 2005, data from Prof. Randall Vaughn, Baylor Univ., posted to NANOG.

ASN	Responsible Party U	nique C&Cs	Open-unresolved
6517	YIPESCOM - Yipes Communicatio	n 60	41
21840	SAGONET-TPA - Sago Networks	90	24
25761	STAMINUS-COMM - Staminus Cor	nmu 86	20
4766	KIXS-AS-KR Korea Telecom	43	20
13680	AS13680 Hostway Corporation Ta	22	19
21698	NEBRIX-CA - Nebrix Communicat	i 24	18
13301	UNITEDCOLO-AS Autonomous Sy	/ste 27	17
21788	NOC - Network Operations Cente	29	16
29415	EUROWAN-ASN OVANET - EuroW	/an d 16	15
13749	EVERYONES-INTERNET - Everyo	nes 24	14
30083	SERVER4YOU - Server4You Inc.	21	14
25700	SWIFTDESK - SWIFTDESK VENTU	JRE 13	13
23522	CIT-FOONET - CREATIVE INTERN	ET 14	12
27595	ATRIVO-AS - Atrivo	31	11
13237	LAMBDANET-AS European Backb	one 11	11





ASNs with	10 or more unresolved and open	suspect	C&Cs:
ASNumber	Responsible Party	Count	Open/Unresolved
21840	SAGONET-TPA - Sago Networks	53	34
30058	FDCSERVERS - FDCservers.net LL	65	32
30083	SERVER4YOU - Server4You Inc.	41	28
12832	LYCOS-EUROPE Lycos Europe GmbH	31	27
23522	CIT-FOONET - CREATIVE INTERNET	25	23
174	COGENT Cogent/PSI	45	23
13680	AS13680 Hostway Corporation Ta	22	22
6461	MFNX MFN - Metromedia Fiber Ne	23	18
27595	ATRIVO-AS - Atrivo	27	16
15083	INFOLINK-MIA-US - Infolink Inf	19	15
4766	KIXS-AS-KR Korea Telecom	41	15
8560	SCHLUND-AS Schlund + Partner A	28	14
27645	ASN-NA-MSG-01 - Managed Soluti	19	12
13237	LAMBDANET-AS European Backbone	15	12
1113	TUGNET Technische Universitaet	12	11
13301	UNITEDCOLO-AS Autonomous Syste	16	11
6939	HURRICANE - Hurricane Electric	12	10
16265	LEASEWEB LEASEWEB AS	13	10
21698	NEBRIX-CA - Nebrix Communicati	25	10





The following slides cover some recent arrests of people involved in various aspects of the botnet economy. Not all were direct users of botnets.

Maksym Vysochanskyy/OEM Spammer: \$400K-\$1M loss. Spamming, sold pirated software and counterfeit goods; arrested in Thailand May 2003.

Jay Echouafni/Paul Ashley/Foonet: Denial of service with botnets.

Foonet is still a major source of botnet controllers.

Netherlands case: 3 Romanians with fake Belgian passports, giant (1.5M+ bot) botnet(s) (Toxbot/Codbot).

Tucson cashers: \$600K+; 17 charged.

"Shadowcrew": \$4M credit card fraud; busted by U.S. Secret Service.

"Botmaster": Adware/affiliate program.

Ruslan Ibragimov/send-safe.com: Professional appearance, criminal operation.

Microsoft lawsuits in Washington state court against 13 spam operations.



Botnet users: Maksym Vysochanskyy/OEM Spammer



🕹 Guilty Plea in International Software Piracy and Financial Crime Prosecution: Case Involves Extradition for In	itellectual Property Crimes (November 💶 🗗 🗙
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For Immediate Release November 29, 2005	Christopher P. Sonderby Office: (408) 535-5037
Guilty Plea in International Software Piracy and Financial Crime I	Prosecution:
SAN JOSE - United States Attorney Kevin V. Ryan announced that Maksym Vysochanskyy, a/k/a Maksym Kovalchuk, yesterday afternoon in federal court in San Jose to charges of criminal copyright infringement, trafficking in counterfeit go stemming from his global distribution of counterfeit computer software over the Internet from December 2000 to May 200 extradition in a prosecution alleging intellectual property offenses.	, 27, of Ternopil, Ukraine, pleaded guilty late oods, and prohibited monetary transactions)3. The case is one of the first to involve an
The guilty plea follows defendant's extradition from Thailand, where he was arrested in May 2003 on a provisional arrest assistance of law enforcement agents from the U.S. Secret Service and U.S. Postal Inspection Service. A criminal com Vyschanskyy's overseas arrest was made possible when U.S. agents monitoring his email traffic observed him make tra Bangkok to meet him. After contested proceedings, Mr. Vysochanskyy was extradited to San Jose to face federal charg a flight risk since his arrival in the United States.	warrant by the Royal Thai Police with the plaint filed at the time showed that Mr. avel plans from Ukraine to Thailand, and flew to ges in March 2004. He has been held in custody as
United States Attorney Kevin V. Ryan stated: "This ground-breaking case demonstrates the resolve of this office and its nation's intellectual property, whether the threat arises at home or from abroad. It also serves as an example to individua nation's intellectual property that the Department of Justice will vigorously seek their extradition to the United States to a	pioneering CHIP Unit to combat the theft of the als abroad who seek to profit from the theft of our achieve justice."
According to the plea agreement and court records, from December 2000 to May 2003, Mr. Vysochanskyy sold counter numerous Web sites, including cdservice.org, bigcds.net and gold-cds.com. The counterfeit software programs included Done	rfeit software programs on eBay and by operating I titles owned by Adobe, Autodesk, Borland and
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Botnet users: Jay Echouafni / Foonet







Botnet users: Netherlands criminals





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Botnet users: Shadowcrew



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The FBI has confirmed that U.S. adware developer 180solutions is the American business whose cooperation with law enforcement played a part in the October breakup of a European botnet scheme. Dutch authorities say three men were arrested in connection with a scheme in which hundreds of thousands of computers were allegedly infected with malicious computer code and then used as zombie PCs to commit additional crimes.

In a similar case, a federal grand jury yesterday indicted Jeanson James Ancheta of Downey, California. The indictment, filed in U.S. District Court in Los Angeles, alleges Ancheta wrote and disseminated malware that assembled armies of infected PCs (known as bots, because they essentially become programmed to function as automatons or robots), then sold access to those PCs to hackers and spammers.

Ancheta also allegedly used the botnets (or networks of bots) to generate income from the surreptitious installation of adware on the infected computers, according to the indictment. U.S. prosecutors say the botnets in the American case involved roughly 400,000 PCs.

In the Netherlands case, published reports say that authorities believe the botnet may have consisted of more than a million zombie PCs. According to information provided by the Dutch prosecutor's office, the three men were charged with illegal access to computers, damage to digital networks, installation of adware and spyware, illegal access to PayPal accounts, and receiving stolen goods.

In the American case, U.S. prosecutors charge that Jeanson James Ancheta of Los Angeles, as well as an unnamed co-conspirator, used a botnet to disseminate and install adware from two firms: Loudcash and Gammacash. The unauthorized installations resulted in regular payments of thousands of dollars per month from both firms to Ancheta and his cohort, who authorities believe is based in Florida, prosecutors said.

(PC World, http://abcnews.go.com/Technology/PCWorld/story?id=1314632)



Botnet users: Ruslan Ibragimov/send-safe.com







Botnet users: 13 spam operations sued by Microsoft, Aug. 17, 2005

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😻 Stopping Zombies Before They Attack: Microsoft Teams with Federal Trade Commission and Consumer Action to Promote PC Protection: "Don't Get 🔳 🗗 🔀					
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News Archive Corporate Information Microsoft Executives Fast Facts About Microsoft Image Gallery Related Sites Analyst Relations Community Affairs	 WASHINGTON, D.C., Oct. 27, 2005 – Like medical researchers studying a strain of a contagious virus, Microsoft Internet Safety Enforcement investigators carefully experimented this summer with a tiny piece of malicious code used by computer criminals to hijack personal computers. The investigators began by placing a single copy of the code onto a healthy computer and then connected the computer to the Internet. Almost immediately, the researchers noticed the first rumblings of life. The infected computer sent an alert with its Internet location and hijack status to a distant server. Then, connection requests from hundreds of Internet Protocol (IP) addresses poured into the machine, commanding the infected computer to distribute millions of illegal spam e-mails. 	Related Links Press Releases: • Don't Get Tricked on Halloween: Federal Trade Commission, Consumer Action and Microsoft Warn Internet Users of Zombie Computers - Oct. 27, 2005			
Community Attains Essays on Technology Executive E-Mail Investor Relations Microsoft Research	 These requests meant one thing: the investigators had successfully created a "zombie" computer. Today, Microsoft, the U.S. Federal Trade Commission (FTC) and Consumer Action, a public watchdog and education group, launched a campaign aimed at helping consumers prevent their computers from getting turned into zombies. Timed to coincide with National Cyber Security Awareness Month and Halloween on Oct. 31, the "Don't Get Tricked on Halloween" campaign alerts computer users to the threat of zombie computers and how to protect their personal computers (PCs) from being infected with malicious code. In addition, Microsoft is announcing a legal enforcement action that for the first time specifically targets illegal e-mail operations that connect to zombie computers to send spam. "The only way to slow the spread of zombies and other online threats is by going after them as resolutely and in as many ways as possible," says Tim Cranton, director of Microsoft's Internet Safety Enforcement programs. 	Presentation: • How Zombie PCs Operate: A Graphical Presentation - Oct. 27, 2005 (Microsoft PowerPoint file, 1.1 MB) Feature Stories: • Q&A: Microsoft Teams with National Cyber Security Alliance for Awareness Month - Oct. 3, 2005 Virtual Newsrooms: • Security & Privacy			
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Botnet defense: Multiple problems to address



- Endpoint/client security. The end user's computers are vulnerable to attack, compromising authentication credentials and control of the host. A fake site can be made completely indistinguishable from a real one—control of your OS means potential control of the display and keyboard.
- 2. Network security. Malicious traffic flows freely; compromised hosts stay on the network.
- 3. Web site/server security. The mechanisms by which users gain access tend to be weak and easily obtained from end users (unencrypted username/password); the same problems which afflict clients are also prevalent (failure to patch, lack of adequate security mechanisms).
- 4. The human element. People are fooled even by bad fakes, don't adequately take steps to secure systems, they buy things advertised in spam, they sell service to criminals.
- 5. The economic element. The current environment (given the above) provides large financial benefits to criminal use of these resources with tiny risk of being caught. The costs incurred are in most cases small and distributed over a large number of people (the end users).





Prevention

Prevent infections at the host: Endpoint Security, Vulnerability Management.

Prevent malware delivery on the network: Firewalls, Intrusion Prevention Systems, "Clean IP," Mail Filtering, Composite Blocking List.

Prevent unauthorized use of services: two-factor authentication (not a panacea, but raises the bar), better encryption on bank cards.

Prevent sale of services to miscreants: AUPs, contracts, customer screening.

Prevent phishing: Tools to identify fake websites for end users. Education.





Detection

Detection of host infections: Host Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS's), honeypots, monitoring botnet controller activity.

Detection of malware on the network: Network IDS, Netflow, Darknets/Internet Motions Sensors/Internet Telescopes, "honey monkeys."

Detection of spam operations/miscreants: Spamhaus, monitoring miscreant communications.





Response

Nullrouting of botnet controllers Quarantining of bots, automated notifications Bot simulation/intentional infection/monitoring (Microsoft Honey Monkeys, Decoy Bot) Undercover investigation (ICCC, FBI, security researchers) Civil and criminal prosecution





The following is a list of IP addresses on your network which we have good reason to believe may be compromised systems engaging in malicious activity. Please investigate and take appropriate action to stop any malicious activity you verify.

The following is a list of types of activity that may appear in this report:

BEAGLE	BEAGLE3	BLASTER	BOTNETS	BOTS	BRUTEFORCE
DAMEWARE	DEFACEMENT	DI PNET	DNSBOTS	MALWAREURL	MYDOOM
NACHI	PHATBOT	PHI SHI NG	SCAN445	SCANNERS	SI NI T
SLAMMER	SPAM	SPYBOT	тохвот		

Open proxies and open mail relays may also appear in this report. Open proxies are designated by a two-character identifier (s4, s5, wg, hc, ho, hu, or fu) followed by a colon and a TCP port number. Open mail relays are designated by the word "relay" followed by a colon and a TCP port number.

A detailed description of each of these may be found at https://security.gblx.net/reports.html

NOTE: IPs identified as hosting botnet controllers, phishing Websites, or malware distribution sites (marked with BOTNETS, PHISHING, o MALWAREURL respectively) may be null routed by Global Crossing following a separately emailed notice.

This report is sent every day. If you would prefer a weekly report, sent on Mondays, please contact us by replying to this email to request it. We would prefer, however, that you receive and act upon these reports daily.

Unless otherwise indicated, timestamps are in UTC (GMT).

3549 | 208.50.20.164/32 | 2005-01-10 23:23:36 BOTNETS | GBLX Global Crossing Ltd. 3549 | 209.130.174.106/32 | 2005-02-03 15:58:06 tokeat.4two0.com TCP 13222 BOTNETS | GBLX Global Crossing Ltd. 3549 | 146.82.109.130 | 2005-03-24 10:01:30 BEAGLE3 | GBLX Global Crossing Ltd. 3549 | 195.166.97.130 | 2005-03-24 08:40:03 SPAM | GBLX Global Crossing Ltd. 3549 | 206.132.221.37 | 2005-03-24 01:56:13 PHATBOT | GBLX Global Crossing Ltd. 3549 | 206.132.93.5 | 2005-03-23 22:13:40 NACHI | GBLX Global Crossing Ltd. 3549 | 206.165.142.184 | 2005-03-23 09:35:53 SLAMMER | GBLX Global Crossing Ltd. 3549 | 206.165.142.184 | 2005-03-24 12:35:53 SPAM | GBLX Global Crossing Ltd.





A continued arms race between miscreants and defenders: Defenders will infiltrate, monitor, and prosecute—and continue to offer partial solutions that don't address key aspects of the problem.

Miscreants will find new mechanisms to conceal their activity and place further layers of misdirection between themselves and their actions (P2P botnets without controllers, encryption, onion routing). They will continue to find new mechanisms to infect systems and create bots (email delivery, direct network infection, web-delivered code)—duping humans to doing the work for them will continue to be the most difficult issue to address.

The economic aspects of this activity need to be recognized to adequately address it—forcing miscreants to "internalize externalities" (bear the costs they are shifting to others), or to shift the costs to entities that are positioned to address the problem but do not currently have incentive to take adequate action (e.g., ISP liability for malicious network traffic from direct customers).





"For all online users, the report found that concern about identity theft is substantial, and is changing consumer behavior in major ways. Four in five Internet users (80 percent) are at least somewhat concerned someone could steal their identity from personal information on the Internet. Nearly nine out of ten users (86 percent) have made at least one change in their behavior because of this fear:

- 30 percent say they have reduced their overall use of the Internet.
- A majority of Internet users (53 percent) say they have stopped giving out personal information on the Internet.
- 25 percent say they have stopped buying things online.
- 54 percent of those who shop online report they have become more likely to read a site's privacy policy or user agreement before buying.
 29 percent of those who shop online say they have cut back on how often they buy on the Internet."

(Consumer Reports WebWatch, "Leap of Faith: Using the Internet Despite the Dangers")

An AOL/National Cyber Security Alliance study released December 11, 2005 found that 25% of Internet users receive phishing emails each month, and 70% of recipients thought the emails might be from the companies they claimed to be from (i.e., 17.5% of Internet users are fooled). 6% admitted submitting information in response to a phishing attack; 15% said their credit card or bank information had been misused or their identity information stolen and misused. (http://www.staysafeonline.info/pdf/safety_study_2005.pdf)



Further Information



Composite Blocking List: http://cbl.abuseat.org Registry Of Known Spam Operations (ROKSO): http://www.spamhaus.org Bot information: http://www.lurhg.com/research.html "Know Your Enemy: Tracking Botnets," http://www.honeynet.org/papers/bots/ Message Labs 2004 end-of-year report, http://www.messagelabs.com/binaries/LAB480 endofyear v2.pdf CAIDA Network Telescope: http://www.caida.org/analysis/security/telescope/ Team Cymru DarkNet: http://www.cymru.com/Darknet/ Internet Motion Sensor: http://ims.eecs.umich.edu/ The Strider Honey Monkey Project: http://research.microsoft.com/HoneyMonkey/ Christopher Abad, "The economy of phishing," http://www.firstmonday.org/issues/issue10 9/abad/ Brian McWilliams, Spam Kings, 2004, O'Reilly and Associates. Spammer-X, Inside the Spam Cartel, 2004, Syngress. (Read but don't buy.) Gary Warner, "Phishing Investigations: It's Time to Make Some Decisions," April 26, 2005, Infragard Birmingham, AL. Consumer Reports WebWatch, "Leap of Faith: Using the Internet Despite the Dangers," http://www.consumerwebwatch.org/dynamic/web-credibility-reports-princeton.cfm

Jim Lippard james.lippard@globalcrossing.com

